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Informality and corruption  
Ajit Mishra and Ranjan Ray 
Abstract 
The paper considers several determinants of the size of the informal sector and explores the 
implications of corruption. It focuses attention on an issue that has not received much attention 
before, namely, the link between informality and corruption. We show that corruption affects 
both the size and composition of the informal sector in a significant manner. While small firms 
locate in the informal sector to avoid the fixed costs associated with the formal sector, we find 
that even larger firms might prefer informality because of their superior access to corruption. 
The paper shows that there is a U shaped relationship between a firm’s share of its sales in the 
informal sector and the scale of its operations. We also show that imperfections in the credit 
market and wealth inequality are likely to be associated with a larger informal sector. We use a 
large cross-country firm level survey data to provide supporting evidence. The results of our 
exercise have considerable policy implications that extend beyond the micro level framework of 
this study to the wider macro economy. 
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1 Introduction 
The informal sector, which has also been referred to as the “shadow or underground economy” 
[Schneider and Enste (2000)], and “unofficial activity” [Friedman, et al. (2000)], plays a 
significant role in developing economies. The precise definition of the informal sector varies 
considerably but it generally refers to economic activity that is neither taxed nor monitored by a 
government.1  While by the very nature of the concept of informality any measure of the 
informal sector is likely to be tentative, the available evidence suggests that the size of the 
informal sector is quite significant. Consequently, there have been several interesting attempts 
to explain the existence and size of the informal sector.2  
Our main objective is to analyse the role and implication of corruption in this context.  Consider 
a small roadside garage owner reviewing its decision to stay informal.3  It loses out benefits like 
insurance and government work, various credit and benefit schemes designed to help small 
firms. On the other hand, it is subject to various inspections and threats of closure for engaging 
in different illegal activities. But in the presence of corruption both benefits and costs are 
diluted. The firm in question is able to avoid penalties or closure by bribing inspectors and it is 
also able to get some formal sector work using its corruption network. Clearly, corruption is an 
important determinant of the costs and benefits of informality and greater corruption is likely to 
be associated with a larger informal sector. More importantly, corruption affects not just the 
size but also the composition of the informal sector. 
Firm’s choice to be in the informal sector (or to keep part of its business in the informal sector) 
has been studied under different approaches. Operation in the formal sector entails certain fixed 
costs like costs of obtaining license (including extortion payments to license issuing bureaucrats), 
taxes of several kinds and other costs of meeting various regulatory standards. In addition to 
these fixed costs, other factors like complexity of the tax system and high degrees of regulatory 
burden are also cited as barriers to entry to the formal sector.4 This view, often termed as the 
exclusion view [Perry et al. (2007)], highlights the role of reduction in bureaucratic costs and tax 
simplifications as a way of reducing informality.5  Depending on the nature and size of the fixed 
costs, one would expect small (often poor) firms to benefit from being in the informal sector.  
Informality can also be treated as an enforcement problem not very different from the classical 
tax evasion problem [Rauch 1991, Dabla-Norris et al. 2008]. A firm’s choice boils down to 
evaluating the various costs and benefits associated with informality. By choosing to be in the 
informal sector a firm forgoes the benefits of formality but avoids the costs mentioned earlier, 
but it runs the risk of apprehension and penalties. If small firms are more likely to avoid 
detection, then the informal sector is likely to comprise of small firms.   
                                                             
1 In many definitions the shadowy nature of this sector is not raised at all (see for example the Report on 
Definitional and Statistical Issues relating Informal Economy (Government of India). In our paper, the focus 
is more on the illegal shadowy side of the informal sector. This is partly because the actual data used in 
the paper identifies informality with ‘percentage of undeclared sales’. 
2 See Straub (2005), Dabla-Norris et al. (2008), Johnson et al. (2000), Friedman et al. (2000), and Perry et 
al. (2007) among others.  See Gerxhani (2004) for a survey of the literature.  
3 It is based on unstructured interviews with some unregistered garage and restaurant owners in Pune, 
India.  
4 Various authors have emphasized different aspects of these costs. See Loyaza (1996), Johnson et al. 
(2000), Friedman et al. (2000).   
5 The evidence on this is quite mixed. While Bruhn (2010) finds that such reforms had negligible impact in 
Mexico, Fajnzylber et al. (2011) note a significant rise in registration under the SIMPLES program in Brazil.  
Russo (2010) finds start-up costs to be a significant entry barrier to formality.  
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However, as mentioned earlier, the costs and benefits of informality will change drastically in 
the presence of corruption. Firms that can bribe better are more likely to find informality less 
costly. This is where the nature and the exact form of corruption assume importance. As is well 
known, corruption can take different forms; the two dominant forms being extortion and 
collusion. Cases of government officials extorting bribes for licenses and permits have featured 
prominently.6 To the extent these payments are non-discriminatory they act as taxes on all 
firms. Collusion, on the other hand, depends on the joint profitability of the bribing firm and 
corrupt officials and raises the possibility that wealthier firms are more likely to succeed in 
bribery and find corruption more beneficial. This aspect of corruption creates an interesting 
trade off, which is explored in the present paper. Suppose potential firms have different wealth 
or assets to start with and credit imperfections imply that firm size is determined by available 
wealth. Then following the arguments in the previous two paragraphs we are likely to see small 
wealth constrained firms in the informal sector because of all the fixed costs.  For firms with 
greater initial wealth, the benefits of formality will outweigh the costs. However, greater initial 
wealth also implies ability to bribe and greater corruption benefits. If these corruption benefits 
dominate, wealthier firms will also find informality more profitable. In fact we show the 
existence of a U shaped relation between informality and firm size when corruption benefits are 
strong. This has serious implications for designing policies to reduce informality as there is a 
need to go beyond simply targeting small and poor entrepreneurs. If a sizeable number of firms 
prefer informality due to corruption benefits, policy reforms aimed at reducing cost of doing 
business or reducing entry costs to the formal sector will not have the desired effect.7  
The link between corruption and informality has been noted earlier in several empirical 
exercises.8 In a recent empirical study Dreher and Schneider (2010) have found a positive 
relation between corruption and the shadow economy in the case of low income countries. Our 
model predicts a similar positive relationship between corruption and informality and we also 
offer evidence to support this link.  The detailed mechanism and implications of this link in the 
present context are strikingly different and new. 9  Our paper is also related to previous work by 
Choi and Thum (2005). They consider both forms of corruption but it is only extortion which 
plays a strategic role in their model. Firms entering the formal sector are subject to extortion 
demands and this is limited by the firm’s option of locating in the informal sector. Hence 
corruption leads to some sort of complementarity between the formal and the informal sector.  
Our model differs in a number of ways. We consider uniform extortion but focus on the collusion 
aspect in an imperfect credit market environment. More importantly, unlike the positive 
relationship that our model predicts, corruption and informality are likely to be negatively 
related in their model. 10  
Moreover, corruption can be affected by the size of the informal sector in the sense that a large 
informal sector has the potential to reduce the tax revenue and dilute the anti-corruption efforts 
making bribery more attractive.  From a policy viewpoint, this is an important issue to 
investigate since if, the interaction between the two is mutual, positive and significant, with 
informality and corruption feeding off one another, an integrated strategy in dealing with both is 
                                                             
6 See Mishra (2005) for a comprehensive survey and for some of the important contributions in the 
corruption literature. 
7 Note that our analysis does not apply to all large firms since operation in the informal sector is not a 
serious option for very large firms because of their visibility, reliance on formal contracting etc.  
8 See Johnson et al. (1998), Friedman et al. (2000), and Dreher and Schneider (2010). 
9 The possibility of firms enjoying informality at the two ends of size or wealth distribution has recently 
been noticed by McKenzie and Sakho (2010).  Our paper is consistent with this evidence and offers an 
alternative explanation.    
10 Recently we came across Samuel and Alger (2011) which models corruption and informality but in an 
entirely different context (foreign aid).  
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likely to be more effective. We discuss how our basic model can be extended to incorporate this 
aspect.  
The interplay between fixed costs of being in the formal sector and wealth dependent 
corruption benefits also implies that the size of the informal sector is related to the distribution 
of income or initial wealth. We show that greater inequality will be associated with a larger 
informal sector and this association is quite evident in the cross-country regressions.  The issue 
of increasing inequality leading to a bigger informal sector is related to earlier contributions by 
Rosser et al.(2000), Chong and Gradstein (2007). But our analytical framework and the data sets 
are quite different.  The existing explanations rely on the argument that inequality can affect 
informality by increasing the number of wealth constrained entrepreneurs who are likely to be 
in the informal sector, especially with lack of access to formal credit. In our model, inequality 
affects informality even when the number of wealth constrained entrepreneurs stays same but 
the number of richer entrepreneurs preferring informality is higher.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model that is used to 
study the link between corruption and informality. We discuss the conditions which lead to 
informality at the two opposite ends of the wealth distribution and consequently a U-shaped 
relation between informality (percentage of undeclared sales) and firm size (size of customer 
base). In Section 3 the basic model is extended in several directions. We show that inequality 
and informality are positively related and this result is robust to alternative specifications in our 
empirical analysis.  Our analysis is suggestive of a positive relation between informality and the 
degree of imperfection in the credit market [Straub (2005)], though it is likely to be weaker in 
the presence of strong corruption benefits. The possibility of feedback from informality to 
corruption can be used to show why lower taxes need not necessarily be associated with a larger 
formal sector.  Section 4 discusses the data and reports the empirical evidence. We use the 
World Business Enterprise Survey (WBES) data from the two main rounds to gather information 
about the extent of informal sales by a firm.   Section 5 concludes. 
2 A Simple Model 
Consider a set of potential entrepreneurs (also referred to as firms) differing in asset (income) A, 
distributed according to G(A), A  ≤ A ≤ A .11 Production can take place either in the formal 
sector (F) or in the informal sector (I). A potential entrepreneur can get a fixed payoff by not 
undertaking production at all.  Should it choose to produce, it makes an investment K and 
produces output RjK, j=F, I; K ≤ A, RF ≥ RI.12 Operation in the formal sector involves fixed non-
production cost C which has several components including the costs of obtaining various licenses 
and permits to undertake production, costs of compliance with government stipulated rules and 
regulations. It could also include bribe payments (extortion) that the entrepreneur might have to 
make to obtain the permits and licenses. Formal sector profits are taxed at a constant rate t. 
However, by locating in the informal sector an entrepreneur avoids incurring these costs C and 
payment of taxes. But entrepreneurs in the informal sector always run the risk of being 
apprehended by an inspector and losing their entire profit.  
                                                             
11The corresponding density is denoted by g(A), the upper bound on A allows us to consider simple 
constant returns technology.  G(A) satisfies the usual properties, G( A ) = 1, G/ ≥0. 
12 R refers to the productivity parameter. In the absence of any credit market, if a firm chooses to produce 
then K = A for any R>0.  We introduce credit market and further restrictions on R later in Section 3.  
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2.1 Informality 
Each firm is inspected with probability θ by an inspector. An honest officer would report the 
non-compliant firm.  Assuming risk neutrality, payoffs (expected payoffs) in the formal (VF) and 
informal (VI) sectors can be easily derived. 
ARAV
tCARAV
II
FF
)1()(
)1)(()(


                                                                           (1) 
Since VI(C) >0 for θ<1, there will always be firms in the informal sector.  Note that entrepreneurs 
with A ≤ C will never be in the formal sector, the question is why some entrepreneurs who are 
able to join the formal sector (A>C) prefer to stay out. We shall assume that (1-t)RF > (1-θ)RI.  It 
can be shown that entrepreneurs with A ≥ A* will choose to be in the formal sector where A* is 
given by 
C
R)(R)t(
C)t(RA
IF
F* 



11
1
                                                                       (2) 
The above expression captures the well-known exclusion and enforcement approaches to the 
determinants of the informal sector. Factors like regulatory burden, license fees, extortion 
payments, other lump sum taxes determine the size of the informal sector by affecting C.  Higher 
taxes raise A* and consequently leads to a smaller formal sector. Similarly, better enforcement 
efforts would lead to a higher θ and consequently smaller informal sector. 13   
Let V0 be the payoff to an entrepreneur who chooses not to undertake production. We shall 
assume that V0 is independent of A and there exists A0 such that VI (A0) =V0.  Hence all 
entrepreneurs with A0≤ A<A* will choose to be in the informal sector.  
2.2 Corruption and the Informal Sector 
Suppose inspectors are corruptible and can be bribed by the firms to hide non-compliance. This 
obviously dilutes the enforcement efforts and increases the profitability of the informal sector. 
However, access to corruption is likely to differ across entrepreneurs and we explore the 
implications of this unequal corruption benefits in the following paragraphs.  
2.2.1 The Institutional Setting 
The regulator employs some risk-neutral inspectors to inspect the firms and each inspector 
receives a fixed wage W. We assume that each inspector inspects only one firm and can detect 
whether the firm has complied or not. The inspector can (truthfully) report non-compliance by 
the informal sector entrepreneur or suppress this information in exchange for a bribe.14  Bribery 
gets exposed with some probability  and following exposure the corrupt inspector is fired and 
loses its wage income.15  
2.2.2 Bribery 
As is evident from the corruption literature, the exact amount of bribe will depend on several 
factors including the distribution of bargaining powers between inspector and the entrepreneur, 
                                                             
13 See Perry et al.(2007). Here θ can be interpreted as ‘the rule of law’ which is highlighted as a key 
determinant (i.e. Dabla-Norris et al. (2008)). The informality-taxes link is not so straightforward; a large 
informal sector can co-exist with lower taxes. We discuss this issue later in Section 3.  
14 To keep things simple we do not consider the possibility of extortion where the inspector could extort 
from the formal sector firms by threatening to report. 
15 It can be generalized to a case where the inspector gets an additional reward while reporting truthfully 
and incurs an additional cost/fine in addition to losing wage income when caught having taken a bribe. 
See Besley and McLaren (1993), Mookherjee and Png (1995), Mishra (2005) for various anti-corruption 
regimes and mechanisms. 
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the disagreement payoffs and the total benefit from collusion. We assume that bribe is 
determined using the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution, inspector’s bargaining power being 
α, 0<α<1. Agreement implies that the firm is not reported and the inspector receives a bribe B. 
Failure to agree leads to the firm being reported for non-compliance and forfeiting all its profit 
(RIA).   Collusion is feasible if the joint surplus from agreement is greater than the sum of 
disagreement payoffs. This implies that bribery will take place when  
 RI A ≥ δW, or A ≥Ac where Ac=  δW/RI                                                           (3) 
This implies that the smaller and less wealthy entrepreneurs will not be able to bribe their way 
out.16   
2.2.3 Corruption and Scale Benefits 
Given risk neutrality and the assumption of Nash Bargaining Solution, bribe B will be given by 
B(A)=αRI A +(1-α)δW                                                                                    (4)    
Now, the expected payoff in the informal sector can be shown to be  
 







c
I
c
II
I AAAR
AAWARAR
AV
)1(
))(1(()1(
)(


                               (5) 
Like before, an entrepreneur with VI > VF, VI ≥ V0 will choose to be in the informal sector, where 
VI and VF are given by (5) and (1). Figure 1 below plots VF and VI.   The slope of VI changes at A= 
AC, reflecting the fact that corruption increases the attractiveness of the informal sector beyond 
this point. If corruption benefits are strong leading to a steeper VI, then as shown in Figure 1 
there will be two intersection points A1 and A2 with VI ( A )>VF ( A ).  However, even with a 
steeper VI (for A≥ AC), it is not always the case that VI intersects VF from below (as shown by the 
dotted line).  The following two conditions regarding the slope of the VI and the location of AC 
will determine the size and the composition of the informal sector.  
D1: The formal sector has low productivity advantage over the informal sector if
t
RRR IfI 


1
1 
. This will be the case when formal sector productivity is not very high and 
the firm’s bargaining power (1-α) is not small.17 Note that this productivity difference is likely to 
be sector specific and in our model it is independent of the firm.  
D2: Anti-corruption regime is moderate if AC>A* where AC and A* are given by (3) and (2) 
respectively. This condition implies that the marginal entrepreneur indifferent between the two 
sectors is not going to benefit from corruption because collusion is not feasible. Entrepreneurs 
who are in the formal sector in the absence of corruption are the likely beneficiaries of 
corruption should they choose to be in the informal sector. The condition is going to be satisfied 
if bribery is likely to be discovered with a higher probability () and the efficiency wage of the 
inspector (W) is high. The complementary case AC≤A*will be realized when anti-corruption 
                                                             
16 Note that probability of agreement is zero for A<AC and one otherwise. An earlier version considered 
heterogeneous inspectors (with private moral cost) where probability of agreement increases with A in a 
continuous fashion. The qualitative results remain the same.  The feature that wealthier entrepreneurs 
have better access to corruption has implications in more general contexts. See Glaeser et al. (2003) for an 
example where the rich uses its wealth to subvert the judicial system and appropriate benefits.  In 
addition to access, the bribe amounts also differ- we recognize this but we are unable to verify it in our 
dataset. 
17 Note that for α=1, the inspector has all the bargaining power and the presence of corruption does not 
make any difference to the incentives of the firms. We have taken α to be a constant but one can argue 
that wealthier entrepreneurs are likely to have higher bargaining powers which will reinforce the point 
that corruption benefits are higher for the wealthy.  
Bath Papers in International Development and Well-Being 
Paper Number 21 
6 | P a g e  
 
regime is weak. We can also consider a third case, strong anti-corruption regime with AC ≥ A , 
but corruption does not make a difference in this case.  
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the case where both conditions D1 and D2 are satisfied.  Denoting the formal 
and informal sectors as F and I respectively, it is clear that the informal sector (I) will have two 
segments (as given in (6)).  
,)(,)()(
2
12
1
0
 
A
A
A
A
A
A
dAAgFdAAgdAAgI                       (6) 
Entrepreneurs with A0≤ A<A1 and A2 <A ≤ A will choose to be in the informal sector where A1 
and A2 are given by the following. 
)AA(
)t(RR)(
R)(AA
,AACAA
*c
fI
I*
c**





11
1
2
1

                                                 (7) 
VI (A0) =V0 and A2 ≤ A . 
These two segments correspond to the following two effects. 
(1) Scale benefits (presence of C) imply that VI is likely to be higher at lower values of A and VF 
will dominate for higher values of A. This aspect is present in most explanations of the informal 
sector and these benefits are captured by the relative position of A*.18 
(2) Corruption benefits imply that the informal sector becomes more attractive at higher values 
of A because of the ease of bribery.  The extent of corruption benefits depend on the strength of 
the anti-corruption regime (D2) and the magnitude of the productivity differential (slope of VI or 
D1). 
                                                             
18 There is an additional source of scale effects if we assume that the probability of detection θ depends 
on size. For example De Paula and Scheinkman (2011) assume that θ = 1 for large firms and θ = 0 for 
smaller firms.   
A 
V 
A  
VI 
VF 
A*=A1 C 
E 
A0 A2 
Figure 1 
AC 
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Depending on these two conditions, four different possible cases obtain and these are 
summarized in Table 1. As mentioned earlier, equations (6)-(7) and Figure 1 refer to case II in the 
table.  The details regarding other cases are given in the Appendix. 
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Table 1 (Impact of corruption on the size of I/F), γ= (1-θα)/(1-t) 
 
 RF  <  RIγ 
Productivity difference low 
RF ≥ RIγ 
Productivity difference high 
A*>Ac (Weak Anti-
corruption regime) 
Formal sector F vanishes with 
corruption  
 (I) 
I is higher with corruption 
 
(III) 
A*≤Ac (Moderate anti-
corruption regime) 
I is higher and it contains both 
poor and rich (A) firms (II) 
I stays the same with 
corruption  
(IV) 
 
It is clear that the informal sector is larger in the presence of corruption except when the 
productive advantage of the formal sector is substantial and anti-corruption regime is moderate 
(case IV). This is shown in the Figure with AC to the right of A* and the VI is given by the dotted 
line.  In this case, the scope of corruption exists but it does not make a difference to the firms in 
the informal sector. The firms who would find it profitable to engage in corruption do not have 
to do so because they are in the formal sector. At the other extreme, when AC is to the left of A* 
and productivity difference is low, VI stays above VF for the whole range and we have no formal 
sector.  
It is also easy to see how the formal sector is affected by the changes to non-production cost C, 
enforcement effort θ and anti-corruption efforts W. A rise in C (interpreted as regulatory 
burden), for example, shifts VF to the right (without any change in VI) resulting in a smaller 
formal sector. A rise in θ (interpreted as rule of law) shifts VI to the right (depending on other 
variables like α and W) and leads to a rise in the formal sector. Increases in anti-corruption 
drive (W) shifts the VI (beyond AC) to the right and leads to a bigger formal sector. We 
summarize these in the following proposition, leaving the algebraic verifications to the 
Appendix.  
Proposition 1: 
(i) The informal sector is always bigger in the presence of corruption, except when anti-
corruption efforts are moderate and the formal sector productive advantage is very 
large.  The formal sector is increasing in W and θ, and decreasing in C and taxes. 
(ii) When control of corruption is moderate and formal sector productive advantage is 
low, entrepreneurs with low as well as high levels of A are likely to prefer informality, 
leaving entrepreneurs with medium levels of A in the formal sector. 
Interpretations 
Whether the informal sector has multiple segments or not (as defined by the various cases in 
Table 1) is an empirical issue.  Given the assumptions of our model, a firm with a higher A will 
also choose to have a higher K.  Hence higher values of A can somewhat be identified with larger 
firms. Since informality is being captured by the extent of undeclared sales, this implies that 
small and large firms would tend to hide more compared to medium sized firms.  
Corollary 1: Small and large sized firms have a higher proportion of undeclared sales compared to 
medium sized firms.  
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There is some evidence to support this U shaped relationship. Using the number of customers 
served in the previous year as a proxy for customer base the following plot between informal 
sales and customer base does indeed reveal a distinct U shape. Our regression results (see 
Section 4, Section 4.4 &Table 5) also lend support to this U shaped relationship between 
informal sales and customer base.  
 
 
Figure 2: Informal Sales and Size (Customer Base) 
 
Interestingly, a similar non-linearity has been observed by McKenzie and Sakho (2010) in their 
study of the Bolivian firms. Using survey data they estimate the impact of formality (registering 
for tax purpose) on firm profits. They find that tax registration increases profitability of medium 
sized firms but it has no effect on the profitability of small and large firms. It can be argued that 
registration involves some cost (fixed as well as variable) but the main benefit of registration is 
the ability to increase the customer base. For small firms with limited capacity the increase in 
potential customer base does not add to profits and for large firms with already large customer 
base the potential for further rise is small. Hence only the medium sized firms profit from 
formalization. 
3 Extensions and Discussions  
3.1 Inequality  
How does the distribution of A affect the size of the informal sector? While some empirical 
studies have noted a negative link between inequality and the size of informal sector, the 
mechanism through which asset or income distribution affects informality is far from clear.19 In 
our model context, inequality matters to the extent it affects the number of wealth constrained 
entrepreneurs and the number of rich entrepreneurs with easy access to corruption. Since we 
want to highlight this issue, we shall focus on case II. 
Unequal distribution of A implies that some potential entrepreneurs are likely to join the 
informal sector because of their inability to raise sufficient capital.  This is a simple implication of 
the scale effects we discussed earlier and the absence of any credit market. 20  Using Figure 1 we 
can get an idea of how changes in inequality will affect the size of the informal sector. Following 
a redistribution of assets/income, the informal sector is likely to be higher if there are more 
                                                             
19 See Rosser et.al. (2000), and Chong and Gradstein (2007).  Similarly, the level of perceived corruption in 
an economy has also been shown to be negatively related to income inequality.  A more unequal society 
can lead to more corruption by inducing entry of inefficient but corruption-prone firms (Dutta and Mishra 
(2011). 
20 As we shall argue in the next section, existence of an imperfect credit market where ability to raise 
capital depends on existing wealth leads to similar results.  It must be noted that Straub (2005) also leads 
to similar conclusions regarding the effect of inequality.  
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entrepreneurs at the lower end of the distribution.21  However, we have entrepreneurs who are 
not wealth constrained but still prefer to be in the informal sector because of their ability to 
bribe and engage in corruption. Hence, redistribution affects informality if there are more 
entrepreneurs at the other (higher) end of the distribution. The size of the informal sector goes 
up if there are more entrepreneurs with assets in excess of A2.  
Definition D3: Consider two distributions G and G/ with the same support [ A  A ]. Distribution 
G/ is considered more unequal if it is derived from G through mean preserving spreads of either 
or both of the following kinds.  
1)  Consider distribution G and two individuals i & j with A1 <Ai <A1 + , Ai < Aj,  < (A1-A0).  
In G/, assets of i & j are given by Ai/= Ai - and Aj/= Aj + 
2) Consider two individuals with A2 - <Aj <A2, Ai<Aj.  In G/, assets of i & j are given by Ai/= 
Ai - and Aj/= Aj + 
Hence inequality goes up if the ensuing distribution has thicker tails in the sense defined above. 
Recall that the informal sector comprises up the two tails of the distribution. Our definition of 
mean preserving spread essentially implies that income/asset is transferred from a poor to a rich 
in such a way that either the poor enters the tail (lower) or the rich enter the tail (upper).   Using 
the previous arguments and definitions, we have the following proposition.  
Proposition 2:  Consider two distributions G(A) and G/(A) such that G/ is more unequal than G in 
the sense of D3. The informal sector under G/ is larger. 
We do find support for the existence of a robust and positive relation between informality 
(percentage of informal sales) and inequality (GINI coefficient). The plot below indicates a clear 
positive relation, which is confirmed in the various regressions we report in section 4.  
 
 
Figure 3: Lowess Plot of Informal Sales to Income Inequality, country average, 2002-2005. 
3.2 Credit market  
The simple model outlined in Section 2 does not capture the fact that entrepreneurs can use the 
credit market to choose a suitable level of K. Consider a case where formal sector firms can 
borrow but informal sector firms do not have access to any form of credit.22  However, credit 
                                                             
21 However, informal sector is likely to be unchanged if for distributions G and G/, G/(A0)> G(A0) but G
/ and 
G coincide over the interval [A0 A1]. Clearly inequality has increased, but in such a case, inequality will have 
no effect on informality. 
22 This can be extended to a situation where informal sector firm also gets credit but at a higher cost. We 
allowed for equal access in an earlier version.  Although, we do not find strong empirical justification for 
differentiated and unequal access, equal access is more likely to make informality attractive.  
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market imperfections imply that credit contracts are not enforced perfectly.23 Credit market is 
otherwise competitive where the gross interest rate ρ is taken as given. Suppose the 
entrepreneur borrows an amount L and invests K. If it defaults the bank can recover only a 
fraction τ of the total return RK, 0 ≤ τ < 1. It will default if the cost of default (τRK) is lower than 
the repayment obligation (Lρ). To avoid such default, the bank will choose L (for a project of size 
K) such that  
 Lρ ≤ τRK                                                                                                          (8) 
Consider an entrepreneur in the formal sector with asset A.  Note that C has to be paid from 
own income and only (A-C) can be used to invest in the production process. To make a total 
investment of K, it needs to borrow (K-A+C). Using (8) it is clear that the maximum investment it 
can undertake will be given by 
 KF(A) = ρ(A-C)/(ρ-τRF), ρ > 0                                                                         (9) 
Assuming RF>ρ, entrepreneurs will in fact borrow and invest the maximum amount. For the 
informal sector entrepreneur,  KI(A) = A. 
To focus attention on the role of credit market imperfections we shall consider a case where 
corruption does not affect the size of the informal sector. Consider the basic model of 
informality with RF = RI =R and t = 0. Additionally, assume moderate anti-corruption efforts.  It is 
clear that this corresponds to case IV in Table 1.  The payoffs will now be given as 
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The cut-off value A* such that entrepreneurs with A≥ A* will be in the formal sector will now be 
given by 
)R()R(
)(C*A
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1
                                                                        (12) 
It is easy to verify that 0



*A
.24  We shall use τ to denote the degree of imperfection, a low 
value suggesting greater difficulty in raising capital. Hence the size of the informal sector is 
positively related to the degree of imperfections. An imperfect credit market implies difficulties 
in obtaining funds and since formal sector involves scale benefits, increased imperfections will 
lead to a smaller formal sector.  It can be verified that this relationship between the informal 
sector and the degree of imperfections in the credit market holds for other cases I- III as well. A 
rise in τ shifts the VF line to the left leading to a fall in A1 (or A* depending on the case) and a rise 
in A2 leading to a smaller informal sector.  
Proposition 3:  A reduction in the degree of credit market imperfection leads to a smaller 
informal sector.   
We do find support for this relationship. Using the fraction of non-performing loans (npl) as a 
proxy for τ, we find a positive relation between npl and informal sales.  
                                                             
23 There are various ways in which credit market imperfections in the presence of wealth constraints can 
be modeled. The present version follows Matsuyama (2000).  
24 The sign of the partial derivative depends on the sign of Cρ(R-ρ)(θ-1).  Since R>ρ and θ<1, this term 
always is negative.  
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Figure 4: Lowess Plot of Informal Sales to Non-Performing Loans, country average, 2002-2005. 
 
This result can be extended to the case where the informal sector also has access to some form 
of credit.  However, the role of the credit market is less obvious in the case where credit needs 
differ across potential entrepreneurs. In our model each entrepreneur borrows to the maximum 
limit, but in a more realistic setting where optimal investment K is finite, there will be some 
entrepreneurs who will not have to borrow.  If the informal sector contains entrepreneurs at 
both ends of the asset distribution, improvements in the credit market will have a reduced 
impact on the size of the informal sector. To the extent the informal sector depends on the 
corruption effect, it will be unaffected by credit market conditions. 
3.3 Taxes and Informality  
It is clear that the informal sector is likely to be smaller (in most cases) with greater anti-
corruption efforts. However, raising either δ or W or both is costly. Suppose spending on 
corruption control depends on taxes being raised in the formal sector. In such an event, raising 
taxes have two opposing effects. Consider Figure 1 and the corresponding case II in Table 1. 
First, a fall in tax rate t will lead to a shift in VF to the left. This will imply a larger formal sector in 
the absence of any corruption benefits or for the same level of corruption control.  But, lower 
taxes imply a fall in δW leading to an upward shift of VI for A≥ AC (the new AC will move further 
to the left).  This means that A2 will fall.  The net effect can be a fall in A1 and a fall in A2 leading 
to, depending on the distribution function G(A), an increase in the size of the informal sector.  
However, we have to be careful about these comparative static exercises. It is clear that 
corruption and informality complement each other and in a model where these two are jointly 
determined in equilibrium, we can have multiple equilibria. We shall use an example to illustrate 
this point.  Let control of corruption (W) be denoted by CC and the size of the formal sector by 
F. Then (CC*, F*) constitute an equilibrium if entrepreneurs’ choice of informality is optimal 
given CC* (and F* is consistent with these choices) and the cost of maintaining the equilibrium 
level of control of corruption depends on the total taxes T raised from the formal sector, Z (CC*) 
= f(T). Total taxes are given by 
dA)A(GFwheredA)A(G)CA(tRT
A
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2
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1
                         (13) 
Example: Let G be a uniform distribution with the support given by 2060  A&A , A0=20, C = 
20, RF=RI = 2, θ = .75, α = 0 and total number of entrepreneurs be 80. Let the tax rate t= ¼. 
Clearly these parameter values satisfy the conditions of case II. In addition, let the cost of 
corruption control be given by Z(CC) = 171+51 (CC-36). It is easy to verify that, for the same tax 
rate, there are two equilibrium outcomes in this case. In one equilibrium outcome the formal 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
10
0
In
fo
rm
al
 S
al
es
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Non Performing Loans 2002-05
Source: WBES, WDI
Informality and corruption 
Mishra and Ray 
13 | P a g e  
 
sector is large and there is greater control of corruption: F= 60 (75% of the entrepreneurs), CC = 
40.  Using (7) it can be checked that A* = A1= 30 and A2=60. In this equilibrium, only the small 
entrepreneurs (20≤ A ≤30) are in the informal sector. Total revenue raised is consistent with the 
level of finance required to support the equilibrium level of corruption control.  However, there 
is another equilibrium with F = 36 and CC = 36.  In the latter case, both poor as well rich 
entrepreneurs (20 ≤ A< 30 and 48 <A≤ 60) are in the informal sector.  
Suppose we lower the tax rate to t=1/5. Now consider the equilibria with the largest formal 
sector corresponding to each tax rate. It is easy to verify that with a lower tax rate we can not 
sustain CC = 40 and the outcome with A2= 60. Some rich entrepreneurs have to leave the formal 
sector (because of lower corruption control) and this further reduces the total taxes and CC. 
Lower taxes induce some entrepreneurs at the lower end of the asset distribution to join the 
formal sector (A* changes from 30 to 29: implying two more firms in the formal sector). But the 
formal sector as a whole shrinks. This shows that lower taxes can co-exist with a smaller informal 
sector.25 
4 Data and Empirical Analysis  
4.1 Data Description 
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) which provided the data set used in this study collect 
information (from the firm level surveys) about a host of questions that include the business 
environment, how it is perceived by individual firms, how it changes over time, and about the 
various constraints on firm performance and growth. The WBES is a repeated cross section data 
set covering a range of developing and developed countries at various stages of development. 26  
The Appendix Table A1 lists the variables from this data set that we have used in this study. The 
variables that are worth special mention in the present context are informal sales (as % age of 
total sales) and bribe demand which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm has been asked 
to pay a bribe and 0, otherwise.  While the WBES data provides information on the 
characteristics and attitudes of the individual firms surveyed, we supplemented this information 
by country level indicators obtained from a variety of sources that have been listed in the second 
half of Appendix Table A1. These include the macro corruption perception and corruption risk 
indicators, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) distributed by Transparency International and   
corruption component of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) supplied by Political Risk 
Services, respectively.27 In our empirical work, we arranged the cpi and icrg variables such that 
higher values denote increased corruption perception and corruption risk. It is important to note 
that while the variable, bribe demand, is a firm level characteristic that contains information on 
whether a firm has been asked for a bribe or not, this is distinct from the country level 
corruption indicators, cpi and icrg, which measure the overall climate of corruption in the 
country. 
The estimations reported below were based on a pooling of the WBES data sets over the period, 
2002-2006. The list of countries by years and showing the number of firms interviewed in each 
country is presented in Appendix Table A2. Starting from a total of 27,086 observations, as 
                                                             
25 The evidence on taxes and informal sector is quite mixed. In a recent study, Dreher and Schneider 
(2010) find little evidence to support a positive relation between taxes and the size of the shadow 
economy predicted by the ‘exclusion’ theories of the informal sector.  
26 Further details are available from the World Bank website, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ . See also 
Batra et al. (2003) for description of the data and some of its principal features. Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) 
use this dataset as well to study the determinants of informality. 
27 See the following websites on details of these perception indictors: http://www.prsgroup.com/ and 
http://www.transparency.org/ . 
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recorded in Appendix Table A2, we lost observations with the inclusion of the various 
determinants dropping down to 17606 observations which dropped further to 10,883 
observations with the inclusion of additional country level characteristics.   
Let us now turn to the results of estimation. The following discussion is subdivided into three 
subsections: Section 4.2 reports the results of single equation regression of a firm’s share of 
sales in the informal sector. Section 4.3 extends the estimation framework by taking note of the 
joint endogeneity of the firm’s informal sales and bribe demand to the firm. Section 4.4 explores 
the robustness of the relationship between the firm’s exposure to the informal sector and its 
scale of operations by adopting an alternative definition of size, namely, the number of its 
customers.  
4.2 The Results of Single Equation Estimation of Informal Sales 
Tables 2a and 2b present the OLS and IV estimates of the regression of informal sales (as % age 
of total sales) on a variety of firm characteristics and country level indicators listed in Appendix 
table A1. The IV estimation is based on the treatment of the corruption perception indicator, 
icrg, for possible endogeneity. Tables 2a and 2b differ because while the former (table 2a)  
includes the bribe demand of the individual firm as a determinant of that firm’s informal sales, 
the latter (Table 2b) excludes this variable  The tables also present the robust standard errors 
and the p-values showing the significance of the estimates. The estimates are mostly well 
determined.  
Tables 2a and 2b provide strong and robust support to Proposition 1 regarding the positive 
association between corruption perception and informal sales. In other words, firms operating in 
countries that are perceived to be more corrupt report, ceteris paribus, a higher share of their 
sales as informal sales. It is worth noting that this result is robust to the instrumentation of 
corruption perception by freedom of press and CO2 emissions. The positive, large and 
statistically significant estimate of the coefficient of the bribe demand variable in Table 2a 
suggests that a firm that has been asked to pay a bribe will increase its undeclared sales as a 
proportion of its total sales quite substantially.  
Tables 2a and 2b also provide some support, though a limited one, to the idea of a U shaped 
relationship between a firm’s exposure to the informal sector and its size, as measured by its 
number of employees. This takes the form of a negative coefficient estimate of the size variable, 
and a positive coefficient estimate of the (size)2 variable. In each table, the estimated coefficient 
of the (size)2 variable increases in size and significance in case of the IV estimates over the OLS 
estimates. The weak significance of the (size)2 coefficient estimate in Tables 2a, 2b is simply a 
reflection of the lack of variation in ‘size’ in the data. As is clear from the definition of firm “size” 
in Appendix Table A1, we did not have variation on firm size between firms within each group, 
namely, “small’, “middle” and “large”. We only had variation in “mean size” between the three 
groups of firms. In other words, given the information, we could only use inter group variation in 
firm size not that between the individual firms. As we report later in Table 5, when firm level 
data on “size”’ proxied by the number of customers of each firm is available, the evidence in 
favour of the U shaped relation between size and informality is much stronger and clearer. The 
U shaped relation suggests that very small and very large firms have a greater exposure to the 
informal sector than the middle-sized firms (as in Corollary 1). In other words, as a firm expands, 
the share of informal sales in its total sales initially increases and then declines. This does not of 
course mean that a very large firm goes completely informal- the result simply suggests that a 
large firm is more likely to supplement its operations in the formal sector by participating in the 
informal sector than does a middle-sized firm.  
Income inequality, measured by Gini coefficient (gini) has a strong and positive effect on 
informal sales. Consistent with Proposition 2 derived earlier, increasing inequality leads to an 
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increase in the size of the informal sector.28Another variable with a positive effect on informal 
sales and with some policy significance is nonperforming loans (npl). This result suggests that in 
a deteriorating credit environment caused by large default of loans due to their non-
performance the informal sector will be larger (Proposition 3). The qualitative results are 
generally robust between the OLS and the IV estimates, i.e. with respect to the sign and 
significance of the estimates, though the magnitude often changes. This is in line with the bias in 
the OLS estimates from the treatment of the corruption perception variable (icrg) as an 
exogenous determinant. These tables also provide evidence on the validity of the instruments 
used. 
Other results from Tables 2a, 2b include the feature that a firm’s perception of the country’s 
legal system is a significant determinant of its decision on informal operations. Increased 
confidence in the country’s justice system (conf_justice) will encourage a firm to reduce 
informality and increase the share of formal sales. A firm that considers the functioning of the 
country’s judiciary as not conducive to its business operations (BClegalsyst) or, alternatively, 
views corruption as a business impediment (BCcorrupt) will increase the share of its total sales 
that it chooses not to declare. This is also true of firms that see labour regulations (BClabregu) as 
a constraint on its business operations. Consistent with these results and that of Dabla-Norris, et 
al. (2008), the large and highly significant coefficient estimate of the rule of law variable (rol) 
suggests that firms operating in countries with superior quality legal systems will declare a larger 
share of their sales or, alternatively, improved legal systems will reduce informality. In other 
words, measures aimed at strengthening legal institutions, stricter enforcement of justice and 
increased confidence in the country’s judiciary are some of the most effective means of 
safeguarding the formal sector and preventing informality.  
Foreign owned firms are much less likely to go informal, but higher income firms and those in 
the export business will have a higher informality. The more literate a country, the higher is the 
size of the informal sector. Note however that this paradoxical result could be due to the 
treatment of bribe demand as an exogenous determinant of informal sales. As the following 
tables show, bribe demand is significantly and negatively affected by the literacy rates. The 
overall message from tables 2a and 2b is one of robustness of the qualitative picture on the 
effects of the principal variables of interest on informal share of sales to the treatment of the 
macro level corruption variable (icrg) as an exogenous or endogenous determinant in the 
econometric specification.  
4.3 Joint Estimation of Informal Sales and Bribe demand 
As discussed earlier, the positive correlation between bribe demand and informality suggests 
that firms that are asked to pay bribes will declare a lower share of their sales. However, this 
relationship can go the other way as well since firms that go informal are more likely to receive 
bribe demands.29 To allow for this joint dependence, and examine robustness of the results to 
the possible endogeneity of the bribe demand variable, we performed joint estimation of 
informal sales and bribe demand. The results are presented in Table 3a with the standard errors 
clustered by firms. Table 3a allows comparison of the effects of the various determinants of the 
two forms of illegality. Such a comparison suggests that the direction of the effect of the firm 
level characteristics and the macro indicators on informal sales and bribe demands is the same 
in most cases, but the magnitude of such effects is generally much larger for informal sales. The 
principal result of Table 2a, namely, the positive impact of bribe demand on informality is not 
                                                             
28 Strictly speaking, the proposition relates to wealth inequality but, given the availability of data on 
wealth inequality for only a limited number of countries, we are using income inequality as a proxy for 
wealth inequality. 
29 This two way causal link has been noticed and discussed earlier by Johnson et al.(2000) in the context of 
a set of transition countries. 
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only robust but the effect is actually stronger in Table 3a which allows for two way feedback 
between the two. Table 3a confirms the reverse causation with informal sales having a positive 
and significant effect on bribe demands though the effect is much weaker.  
Increasing confidence in the country’s judicial system acts a brake on both forms of illegality 
extending the earlier result in Table 2a from informality to corruption. The earlier result that 
rising inequality increases informality is also robust between the two tables. It is also worth 
noting that while inequality has a large, positive and significant effect on informal sales, 
inequality also has a negative and statistically significant effect on bribe demand, though the 
effect is much weaker. The rule of law variable impacts negatively on the corruption variable and 
this is passed on to informality through the positive association between corruption and 
informality. The policy implication is clear- an integrated approach to reducing both informality 
and corruption rests on a strengthening of legal institutions and measures to increase 
confidence in the country’s judiciary. An interesting point of difference between the two forms 
of illegality is that, after controlling for the respondents’ characteristics and country differences, 
while there has an increase in informality there has been a decline in business corruption. 
 Table 3a excludes several of the country level variables from the informal sales equation that is 
reported on the left hand side, though they appear as determinants in the bribe demand 
equation. Prominent examples of such omissions include the rule of law (rol) and human 
development index (hdi).  In other words, these country characteristics are assumed to have an 
impact on informal sales only through the bribe demand variable. Table 3b examines robustness 
of the evidence in table 3a by including all the principal country level variables in the informal 
sales equation just as they do in the bribe demand equation. In other words, all the country 
indicators have both a direct effect and indirect effect on informal sales. The standard errors are 
clustered by firms as in Table 3a. A comparison of Tables 3a and 3b establishes robustness of the 
principal result of Table 3a, namely, the positive and mutually reinforcing relationship between 
informal sales and bribe demand. In fact, the impact of bribe demand on informal sales 
strengthens considerably on the inclusion of the country level variables in the equation for 
informal sales. The rule of law (rol), human development index (hdi) and the unemployment rate 
(unempl) variables, which were all excluded from the informal sales equation reported in Table 
3a, are seen from the left hand side of Table 3b to have a significantly negative direct impact on 
informal sales. It is worth noting from the right hand side of Table 3b that the first two country 
characteristics (rol, hdi) also have a significantly negative impact on bribe demand, though the 
size of the coefficients is smaller compared to those in the informal sales equation.  Literacy has 
reverse impacts on informal sales and bribe demand, positive in case of the former, negative in 
case of the latter. The coefficient estimates in the bribe demand equation in Table 3b are nearly 
all identical to those in table 3a implying that the results in the bribe demand equation are 
robust to the expanded list of country level regressors used in the informal sales equation. It is 
worth noting that the weak support in Table 3a to the idea of a U shaped relationship between 
informal sales and firm size becomes much stronger in Table 3b with the estimated coefficient of 
(firm)2  in Table 3b increasing in size and significance. Table 3 suggests that the turning point 
occurs for a firm with around 600 employees.  
Tables 3a, 3b both suffer from the limitation that while the joint estimations consider the effect 
of business corruption at micro level in the form of the WBES variable, bribe demands, on 
informal sales, they do not control for the corruption perception of the country at the macro 
level. To do so, we repeated the joint estimation with the corruption perception variables, icrg 
and cpi, introduced as additional regressors, on the right hand size of the informal sales and 
corruption equations, respectively. The results are reported in Table 4. 
The positive association between corruption and informal sales manifests itself through the 
large and statistically significant impact of icrg on informal sales. In other words, and consistent 
with tables 2a and 2b, firms operating in countries with higher perceived risk of corruption are 
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likely to experience greater informality.  Note, however, that on the introduction of the country 
wide indicator, icrg, the effect of the firm level bribe demand variable in the informal sales 
equation now weakens to statistical insignificance. This has the policy message that, in countries 
which are not regarded as being at high risk from corruption, bribe demands on the individual 
firms do not have any impact on the firm’s decision on informality. It is the overall corruption 
perception of a country that matters in driving informality, not so much the bribe demands 
made to the individual firms. In contrast, controlling for macro level corruption as measured by 
the corruption perception indicator (cpi) and the other determinants, increased informality does 
lead to significantly higher bribe demands on the firms.  Most of the principal results on 
informality, for example, rising inequality increases informality, increased confidence in the 
country’s judiciary and an improvement in the credit situation brought about by a reduction in 
non performing bank loans reduces informality, is seen from Tables 2 and 4 to be robust 
between the single equation and the simultaneous equation estimates. Note from Table 4 that 
rising inequality as measured by the Gini leads to an increase in both informal sales and bribe 
demands, but the effect on the latter is much weaker.  
Another remarkably robust result is that, ceteris paribus, increasing inequality has a large and 
positive impact on informal sales, consistent with the analytical discussion of this paper. Again, 
as the earlier discussion suggests, a deteriorating credit situation, as reflected in an increase in 
nonperforming bank loans (npl) will tend to increase informal sales. This result is seen most 
clearly from the large and statistically significant positive coefficient estimate of npl on the left 
hand side of tables 4and 4a. The empirical results are subject to the qualification that while they 
establish association they do not necessarily indicate causation.  
4.4 The Relation between Informality and Customer Base 
The empirical evidence presented so far has provided strong support to several of the analytical 
results derived earlier. The weakness in the supporting evidence of the U shaped relationship 
between firm size and informality was, as noted earlier, a reflection of the lack of information on 
the number of employees in each firm giving us very limited variation in “size” as defined by the 
number of employees. To examine whether this is really the case, the informal sales equation 
was re-estimated with the size of the firm’s work force replaced by the number of its customers. 
The reader will recall the preliminary evidence on this presented in Fig. 2 in the form of a U 
shaped relationship between informal sales and the size of customer base. This is confirmed in 
Table 5 that presents the regression results on the subset of firms that provide information on 
its customer base.  The turning point occurs at a firm that has around 20,000 customers, which 
parallels the turning point at a firm with around 600 employees suggested by table 3b. The drop 
in the number of observations due to the paucity of information on customer base explains (a) 
our consideration of a limited set of characteristics, including omission of most of the country 
level determinants, and (b) the drop in statistical significance in several of the coefficient 
estimates. However, consistent with the earlier evidence, the right hand side of Table 5 ( in the 
presence of the icrg variable ) shows that an increase in the share of nonperforming loans to 
total loans (npl) in the economy pushes the firm to greater informality. The coefficient of the npl 
variable is quite large in both size and significance. This table also contains evidence on this 
smaller data set that suggests that exporting firms and those that are foreign owned are much 
less exposed to informality than the domestic firms. Once again, the corresponding coefficient 
estimates are large in both size and significance.  
5 Conclusion  
The principal objective has been to look at the link between corruption and informality. Large 
informal sectors are predominant in developing countries and corruption is also pervasive in 
many of these countries. This is not a simple coincidence; the paper proposes a strong positive 
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link between corruption and informality. Our empirical exercises using firm level data support 
this approach.   
There are several reasons why this corruption-informality link needs to be looked at closely.  It is 
somewhat expected that corruption will dilute enforcement efforts and distort the incentives 
associated with being in the formal or informal sector. However, as we have argued, corruption 
affects not just the average size but also the composition of the informal sector. Since corruption 
benefits are unlikely to be uniform across the population and wealthier entrepreneurs are likely 
to have better access to corruption, we can have a situation where informal sector comprises of 
both wealth constrained poorer firms and wealthier firms.  This might seem counter-intuitive at 
first sight but when we interpret informality as the ‘extent of undeclared sales’, this result has 
strong empirical support.  
An analytical result of considerable significance is the U shaped relationship between a firm’s 
exposure to informality and the scale of its operations. As a firm starts operations on a very 
small scale, it is characterized, initially, by near total informality in the nature of its business. This 
is largely a reflection of its inability to incur the large fixed costs of accessing formal institutions 
and mechanisms. These obstacles diminish as the firm expands, and so does the scale of its 
informal operations. However, beyond a point, there is a tendency for the firm to increase the 
share of its informal sales. This is because once the firm is beyond the turning point its reliance 
on formal institutions and mechanisms diminishes and the rising cost of compliance induces it 
towards greater informality. This does not mean, however, that very large firms and businesses 
are completely informal. This result simply states that very small and very large firms will be 
more exposed to informality in its operations than medium sized firms. The policy significance of 
this result stems from the revenue loss to the exchequer from the increasing tendencyof the 
expanding firms to go informal as its scale of operations increases. This result implies that at the 
macro level as the economy expands, as happened in India during the 1990s and beyond, so did 
the size of the informal sector. The contribution to this expansion of the informal sector came 
not only from the newly opened businesses that were operating on a very small scale, such as 
the tea stalls and the road side traders, but also from the large businesses that were operating 
increasingly in the informal sector. If the firm level U shaped relation between firm size and 
informal sales, that our analytical discussion suggests and for which some empirical support is 
provided, is replicated at the macro level, then we would expect a similar U shaped relationship 
between the aggregate size of the informal sector in the economy and the per capita GNP of the 
country.  To our knowledge, such a hypothesis has not been explored or tested at the macro 
level. This clearly has policy implications for taxes and the hidden economy that is best left for 
future research. 
We extend the basic framework to consider the implications for the relation between 
informality and other factors like inequality, credit market imperfections and taxes. High degree 
of inequality leads to a bigger informal sector. While the positive link between inequality and 
informality has been noted earlier, our paper adds a new dimension to this relationship. 
Suppose we redistribute wealth so that the poorer sections are unaffected, then most models of 
informality would predict that the size of the informal sector or the shadow economy would 
remain unchanged.30  However, the upper tail of the wealth distribution also matters in our 
model and the shadow economy can be larger in such situations if and when the wealthier 
sections enjoy significant corruption benefits. 
Given that wealth or asset distribution plays a central role, we expect credit market 
imperfections to be positively related to the size of the informal sector. We do find a robust link 
between the percentage of undeclared sales and the percentage of non-performing loans. The 
                                                             
30 Though not explicitly stated, this is what models by Straub (2005), Chong and Gradstein (2007) would 
imply. The result can be extended to many other models of informality.  
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relation between taxes and informality is interesting but more complicated. Higher taxes can 
lead to more firms leaving the formal sector, but higher taxes can help sustain greater 
enforcement and anti-corruption efforts resulting in a smaller informal sector. Our analysis in 
this context is quite preliminary, we use an example to illustrate the point but a more detailed 
and complete formulation is left for future research. 
The possibility that corruption and informality complement each other is also extremely 
important from a policy perspective. Our analysis is suggestive of this but a proper exploration of 
this complementarity needs to incorporate political economy considerations. Taxes, 
enforcement efforts and anti-corruption regimes are political decisions and it would be 
interesting to see how the formal/informal sectors affect the choice of these variables through 
political channels.31 
                                                             
31 In Azuma-Grossman (2008) a large informal sector reflects a policy choice that results from the State’s 
inability to tax-discriminate. There is some interesting work in this area that use electoral competition 
models to study the informality –policy choice link, See Flochel (2012).  
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Table 2a: OLS and IV Estimates of Informal Salesa (with the bribe demand variable included) 
Variablesb Coefficientc Robust SE P>|t| Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|t| 
icrg 2.55* 0.29 0.000 icrg_IVd 6.01* 0.61 0.000 
Bribe demand 1.79* 0.39 0.000 Bribe demand 2.08* 0.43 0.000 
size -0.01* 0.003 0.002 size -0.01* 0.003 0.000 
size_squared 0.000005 0.000003 0.147 size_squared 0.000006*** 0.000003 0.054 
firmage -0.07* 0.01 0.000 firmage -0.06* 0.01 0.000 
conf_justice -0.80* 0.14 0.000 conf_justice -0.89* 0.13 0.000 
DEffGovt 1.30 1.00 0.193 DEffGovt 0.42 0.76 0.583 
BClegalsyst 0.64* 0.22 0.004 BClegalsyst 0.69* 0.20 0.000 
BCanticomp 1.21* 0.18 0.000 BCanticomp 1.15* 0.17 0.000 
BCcrime -1.42* 0.21 0.000 BCcrime -1.29* 0.20 0.000 
BCcorrupt 1.88* 0.23 0.000 BCcorrupt 1.59* 0.21 0.000 
BCinstable 1.04* 0.21 0.000 BCinstable 1.05* 0.19 0.000 
BCpolicy -1.03* 0.23 0.000 BCpolicy -1.20* 0.20 0.000 
BClic 0.40** 0.20 0.042 BClic 0.34*** 0.18 0.061 
BClabregu 0.75* 0.20 0.000 BClabregu 0.67* 0.19 0.000 
income 1.35* 0.40 0.001 income 0.81*** 0.43 0.060 
Dexport 0.60 0.49 0.227 Dexport 1.01** 0.48 0.035 
Dforeign -4.35* 0.55 0.000 Dforeign -4.25* 0.59 0.000 
year 0.30*** 0.18 0.096 year 0.45** 0.20 0.022 
npl 0.15* 0.04 0.001 npl 0.22* 0.05 0.000 
gini 0.17* 0.03 0.000 gini 0.10* 0.04 0.006 
lgnp -0.31 0.75 0.684 lgnp -1.97** 0.78 0.012 
rol -6.31* 0.50 0.000 rol -7.70* 0.61 0.000 
literacy 0.51* 0.05 0.000 literacy 0.49* 0.04 0.000 
constant -585.35 367.18 0.111 constant -853.58** 392.05 0.029 
Number of 
Obs.   17662 
Number of 
Obs. 
  
17606 
F(24, 17637)   135.14 F(24, 17581)   128.36 
Prob>F   0.000* Prob>F   0.000* 
R-squared   0.148 
Anderson 
stats: χ2 (2) 4226.675 
 
0.000* 
Root MSE   23.754 
Sargan stats: χ2 
(1) 0.227 
 
0.6339* 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable 
names. c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. d. icrg_IV implies that icrg is 
instrumented by Freedom of Press and CO2 emission. 
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Table 2b: OLS and IV Estimates of Informal Salesa [with the bribe demand variable excluded] 
Variablesb Coefficientc Robust SE P>|t| Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|t| 
icrg 2.47* 0.29 0.000 icrg_IVd 5.74* 0.61 0.000 
size -0.01* 0.003 0.001 size -0.01* 0.003 0.000 
size_squared 0.000005 0.000003 0.141 size_squared 0.000006*** 0.000003 0.055 
firmage -0.070035* 0.009487 0.000 firmage -0.067000* 0.010661 0.000 
conf_justice -0.84* 0.14 0.000 conf_justice -0.93* 0.13 0.000 
DEffGovt 1.19 1.00 0.233 DEffGovt 0.33 0.76 0.667 
BClegalsyst 0.63* 0.22 0.005 BClegalsyst 0.68* 0.20 0.001 
BCanticomp 1.24* 0.18 0.000 BCanticomp 1.18* 0.17 0.000 
BCcrime -1.43* 0.21 0.000 BCcrime -1.31* 0.20 0.000 
BCcorrupt 1.96* 0.23 0.000 BCcorrupt 1.69* 0.20 0.000 
BCinstable 1.03* 0.21 0.000 BCinstable 1.03* 0.19 0.000 
BCpolicy -1.03* 0.23 0.000 BCpolicy -1.19* 0.20 0.000 
BClic 0.46** 0.20 0.019 BClic 0.42** 0.18 0.023 
BClabregu 0.77* 0.20 0.000 BClabregu 0.70* 0.19 0.000 
income 1.40* 0.40 0.000 income 0.89** 0.43 0.039 
Dexport 0.59 0.49 0.232 Dexport 0.98** 0.48 0.040 
Dforeign -4.29* 0.55 0.000 Dforeign -4.19* 0.59 0.000 
year 0.24 0.18 0.195 year 0.37*** 0.19 0.053 
npl 0.14* 0.05 0.002 npl 0.21* 0.05 0.000 
gini 0.15* 0.03 0.000 gini 0.07** 0.04 0.035 
lgnp -0.29 0.75 0.703 lgnp -1.87** 0.78 0.017 
rol -6.54* 0.50 0.000 rol -7.88* 0.61 0.000 
literacy 0.48* 0.05 0.000 literacy 0.47* 0.04 0.000 
constant -450.19 369.44 0.223 constant -706.15*** 388.65 0.069 
Number of 
Obs.   17662 
Number of 
Obs. 
  
17606 
F(23, 17638)   135.79 F(23, 17582)   133.08 
Prob>F   0.000* Prob>F   0.000* 
R-squared   0.147 
Anderson 
stats: χ2 (2) 4275.389 
 
0.000* 
Root MSE   23.765 
Sargan stats: χ2 
(1) 0.662 
 
0.4159* 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable 
names. c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. d. icrg_IV implies that icrg is 
instrumented by Freedom of Press and CO2 emission. 
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Table 3a: Joint Estimates of Informal Sales and Bribe Demand (with country level corruption perception indicators 
excluded), clustered by firms  
Informal Salesa Bribe demanda 
Variablesb Coefficientc 
Clustered 
SE P>|z| Variablesb Coefficientc 
Clustered 
SE P>|z| 
Bribe demand 2.95* 0.79 0.000 informal_sales 0.0011* 0.0002 0.000 
size -0.01* 0.003 0.006 size -0.0001*** 0.00005 0.092 
size_squared 0.000004 0.000003 0.229 size_squared 0.000000 0.000000 0.470 
firmage -0.076* 0.01 0.000 firmage -0.00097* 0.0002 0.000 
conf_justice -0.83* 0.14 0.000 conf_justice -0.02* 0.002 0.000 
DEffGovt 3.69* 1.02 0.000 DEffGovt -0.07* 0.01 0.000 
BClegalsyst 0.42*** 0.23 0.069 BClegalsyst -0.01*** 0.003 0.067 
BCanticomp 1.29* 0.18 0.000 BCanticomp 0.01* 0.003 0.000 
BCcrime -1.07* 0.21 0.000 BCcrime -0.01** 0.003 0.033 
BCcorrupt 2.46* 0.23 0.000 BCcorrupt 0.04* 0.003 0.000 
BCinstable 1.10* 0.21 0.000 BCinstable -0.01** 0.003 0.014 
BCpolicy -0.69* 0.23 0.002 BCpolicy 0.00 0.003 0.452 
BClic 0.15 0.20 0.461 BClic 0.03* 0.003 0.000 
BClabregu 0.53* 0.20 0.007 BClabregu 0.01* 0.003 0.004 
income 1.16* 0.34 0.001 income 0.04* 0.01 0.000 
Dexport 0.64 0.48 0.183 Dexport -0.01 0.01 0.509 
Dforeign -4.98* 0.54 0.000 Dforeign 0.03* 0.01 0.001 
year 0.52* 0.19 0.006 year -0.04* 0.004 0.000 
npl 0.21* 0.04 0.000     
gini 0.47* 0.03 0.000 gini -0.01* 0.001 0.000 
lgnp -3.69* 0.66 0.000 lgnp 0.09* 0.01 0.000 
    rol -0.15* 0.01 0.000 
    hdi -1.12* 0.17 0.000 
    unempl 0.001*** 0.001 0.085 
    literacy -0.02* 0.001 0.000 
    lpop -0.03* 0.003 0.000 
constant -1014.86* 375.96 0.007 constant 77.55* 7.285 0.000 
Number of Obs.   17904 Number of Obs.   17904 
Wald test of significance:  
χ2 (21) 
2632.51 Wald test of significance:  
χ2 (25) 
4713.73 
Prob > χ2   0.000* Prob > χ2   0.000* 
R2   0.126 R2   0.207 
Root MSE   24.01 Root MSE   0.418 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. Bribe demand is measured by the variable that takes a 
value of 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable names.  
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3b: Joint Estimates of Informal Sales and Bribe Demand (with country level corruption perception indicators 
excluded), clustered by firms with all country variables 
Informal Salesa Bribe demanda 
Variablesb Coefficientc 
Clustered 
SE P>|z| Variablesb Coefficientc 
Clustered 
SE P>|z| 
Bribe demand 4.1794* 0.7841 0.000 informal_sales 0.0013* 0.0002 0.000 
size -0.0119* 0.003 0.000 size -0.0001 0.00005 0.119 
size_squared 0.00001** 0.000003 0.016 size_squared 0.00000004 0.0000001 0.521 
firmage -0.058* 0.009 0.000 firmage -0.001* 0.0002 0.000 
conf_justice -0.7986* 0.1376 0.000 conf_justice -0.021* 0.0023 0.000 
DEffGovt 1.83*** 1.035 0.076 DEffGovt -0.07* 0.010 0.000 
BClegalsyst 0.69* 0.227 0.002 BClegalsyst -0.01*** 0.003 0.053 
BCanticomp 1.278* 0.179 0.000 BCanticomp 0.010* 0.003 0.001 
BCcrime -1.35* 0.212 0.000 BCcrime -0.01** 0.003 0.048 
BCcorrupt 1.96* 0.229 0.000 BCcorrupt 0.04* 0.003 0.000 
BCinstable 0.80* 0.204 0.000 BCinstable -0.01** 0.003 0.013 
BCpolicy -0.757* 0.226 0.001 BCpolicy 0.003 0.003 0.407 
BClic 0.142 0.202 0.483 BClic 0.035* 0.003 0.000 
BClabregu 0.50** 0.194 0.011 BClabregu 0.01* 0.003 0.006 
income 1.25* 0.444 0.005 income 0.04* 0.009 0.000 
Dexport 0.42 0.47 0.372 Dexport -0.01 0.008 0.502 
Dforeign -4.11* 0.54 0.000 Dforeign 0.04* 0.010 0.001 
year 0.232 0.192 0.227 year -0.037* 0.004 0.000 
npl -0.08 0.054 0.149 npl 0.001 0.001 0.370 
gini 0.142* 0.038 0.000 gini -0.010* 0.001 0.000 
lgnp 0.70 1.15 0.543 lgnp 0.10* 0.021 0.000 
rol -1.72* 0.48 0.000 rol -0.15* 0.011 0.000 
hdi -41.77* 12.42 0.001 hdi -1.165* 0.195 0.000 
unempl -0.28* 0.044 0.000 unempl 0.001 0.001 0.170 
literacy 0.45* 0.077 0.000 literacy -0.02* 0.001 0.000 
lpop 2.255* 0.166 0.000 lpop -0.031* 0.004 0.000 
constant -459.33 384.887 0.233 constant 76.08* 7.356 0.000 
Number of 
Obs.  17904 Number of Obs.  17904 
Wald test of significance:  
χ2 (26) 
3357.48 Wald test of significance:  
χ2 (26) 
4752.13 
Prob > χ2  0.000* Prob > χ2  0.000* 
R2  0.154 R2  0.206 
Root MSE  23.63 Root MSE  0.418 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. Bribe demand is measured by the variable that takes a 
value of 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable names.  
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 4: Joint Estimates of Informal Sales and Bribe demand (with country level corruption perception indicators, 
icrg and cpi included), clustered by firms 
Informal Salesa Bribe demanda 
Variablesb Coefficientc 
Clustered 
SE P>|z| Variablesb Coefficientc Clustered SE P>|z| 
Bribe demand -0.66 0.52 0.207 
informal_sal
es 0.0006* 0.0002 0.002 
icrg 3.54* 0.423 0.000 cpi 0.0145 0.01 0.128 
size 0.005 0.003 0.162 size -0.00003 0.0001 0.601 
size_squared -0.000008*** 0.000004 0.054 size_squared 0.000000004 0.00000008 0.957 
firmage -0.08* 0.013 0.000 firmage -0.0010* 0.0002 0.000 
conf_justice -0.84* 0.17 0.000 conf_justice -0.02* 0.003 0.000 
DEffGovt 3.16* 1.001 0.002 DEffGovt -0.02 0.018 0.182 
BClegalsyst 0.60** 0.258 0.020 BClegalsyst -0.002 0.005 0.618 
BCanticomp 1.62* 0.222 0.000 BCanticomp 0.02* 0.004 0.000 
BCcrime -0.79* 0.254 0.002 BCcrime -0.01 0.005 0.173 
BCcorrupt 1.73* 0.255 0.000 BCcorrupt 0.05* 0.005 0.000 
BCinstable 0.96* 0.244 0.000 BCinstable -0.001 0.004 0.751 
BCpolicy -1.27* 0.249 0.000 BCpolicy 0.002 0.005 0.702 
BClic 0.04 0.233 0.868 BClic 0.03* 0.004 0.000 
BClabregu 0.35 0.23 0.126 BClabregu 0.02* 0.004 0.000 
income -1.72* 0.48 0.000 income 0.17* 0.01 0.000 
Dexport 0.89 0.59 0.131 Dexport -0.01 0.01 0.183 
Dforeign -4.45* 0.775 0.000 Dforeign 0.001 0.014 0.917 
year 14.99* 0.709 0.000 year -0.06* 0.013 0.000 
npl 2.48* 0.11 0.000     
gini 1.68* 0.06 0.000 gini -0.004* 0.001 0.000 
lgnp 2.65** 1.07 0.013 lgnp 0.22* 0.03 0.000 
    rol -0.24* 0.03 0.000 
    hdi -3.023* 0.401 0.000 
    unempl 0.01* 0.001 0.000 
    literacy -0.05* 0.003 0.000 
    lpop -0.045* 0.005 0.000 
constant -30144.93* 1424.609 0.000 constant 121.52* 26.576 0.000 
Number of 
Obs.   10883 
Number of 
Obs.   10883 
Wald test of significance: χ2 
(22) 3036.67 
Wald test of significance:  
χ2 (26)  2450.68 
Prob > χ2   0.000* Prob > χ2   0.000* 
R2   0.218 R2   0.184 
Root MSE   23.11 Root MSE   0.415 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. Bribe demand is measured by the variable that takes a 
value of 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable names.  
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 5: OLS Informal Salesa (with and without the ICRG variable) 
Variablesb Coefficientc Robust SE P>|t| Variablesb Coefficientc 
Robust 
SE P>|t| 
    icrg 3.321** 1.632 0.042 
customers -0.008* 0.003 0.004 customers -0.0079* 0.00279 0.005 
customers_sq 2.2e-07* 7.1e-08 0.002 customers_sq 1.96e-07* 7.05e-08 0.002 
firmage -0.066 0.044 0.128 firmage -0.062 0.044 0.154 
conf_justice -1.293* 0.465 0.005 conf_justice -1.333* 0.465 0.004 
DEffGovt 2.711 1.680 0.107 DEffGovt 2.456 1.687 0.146 
BClegalsyst -0.650 0.589 0.270 BClegalsyst -0.677 0.589 0.250 
BCanticomp 0.572 0.564 0.311 BCanticomp 0.484 0.569 0.395 
BCcrime 0.321 0.653 0.623 BCcrime 0.430 0.657 0.513 
BCcorrupt 0.216 0.671 0.748 BCcorrupt 0.268 0.674 0.691 
BCinstable 1.219*** 0.661 0.065 BCinstable 1.248*** 0.659 0.058 
BCpolicy -1.873* 0.700 0.008 BCpolicy -1.824* 0.699 0.009 
BClic 0.271 0.632 0.668 BClic 0.259 0.630 0.682 
BClabregu -1.582* 0.596 0.008 BClabregu -1.540** 0.595 0.010 
income -7.959* 1.897 0.000 income -5.720* 2.100 0.007 
Dexport -6.428* 1.614 0.000 Dexport -6.267* 1.620 0.000 
Dforeign -3.655*** 2.188 0.095 Dforeign -3.738*** 2.182 0.087 
npl 0.228 0.143 0.109 npl 0.474* 0.176 0.007 
constant 45.636* 4.748 0.000 constant 32.469* 7.592 0.000 
Number of 
Obs.   2085 
Number of 
Obs. 
  
2085 
F(17, 2067)   9.91 F(18, 2066)   9.84 
Prob>F   0.000* Prob>F   0.000* 
R-squared   0.0494 R-squared   0.0510 
Root MSE   31.831 Root MSE   31.812 
a. Informal Sales is measured as a proportion of total sales. b. See Appendix Table A1 for meaning of the variable 
names. c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
First we examine the different cases in Table 1 and then verify the comparative statics reported 
in Proposition 1. 
1. Note that VF –VI can be written as  
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                (14) 
Hence VF-VI =0 can have at most two roots, A1 & A2. 
(i) Suppose A* < AC.  Since *I
*
FF AR)(AR)t(CR)t(  111 , the smaller of the two 
roots, A1 always exists and A1=A*. Moreover 
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FIFI   111                          (15) 
The other root, A2, will be given by 
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A necessary condition for A2 to exist will be
t
RR If 


1
1 
. However we also need A2 < A , 
hence we need FI R)t(R)(  11   to be sufficiently large or  If RR  . This corresponds 
to case II in the Table. 
On the other hand, if this condition is not satisfied, A2 does not exist in the relevant zone and
AAAVV *FI  0 .  
(ii) Now consider A* ≥ AC.  Clearly VF-VI <0 for all A ≤ AC, hence we can have at most have one 
root. Denote it as A**. Suppose If RR  . This implies that   
0)1()1/()( *  FI
c RtRAA  .                                                                               (17) 
 Using (14), we have  
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Entrepreneurs with A ≥ A** will choose to be in the formal sector, this is smaller than the case 
where there is no corruption. This refers to case III.   
However, if FI R)t(R)(  11  >0, A** does not exist because VF-VI < 0 for all values of A. In 
this case (I), formal sector ceases to exist after the introduction of corruption.  
 
2. Case (II).   
Following the definition of F in (6),  
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Recall that A1= A*. It can be verified that 01 


C
A
.  Moreover, since (1-θ)RI –(1-t)RF <0, it is easy 
to show that 02 

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Hence a rise in C will lead to fall in the size of the formal sector F.   
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Likewise, a rise in θ will lead to a larger formal sector.  From (2), 01 



A
and 02 



A
. Hence  
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Similarly, we expect that greater control of corruption will lead to a bigger formal sector. Any 
rise in W or δ or both will reduce the scope of corruption and raise AC.  Since 02 
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Case (III):   
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It can be verified that 0,0
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Case (IV).  
This case is similar to the case without corruption and  
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Table A1: Appendix – Variable Definitions and Data Sources. 
WBES Variables Firm characteristics  Definition (Source: A)  
Bribe demand Bribe Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is asked for bribe, 0 otherwise  
Informal_sales Informal Share in Sales Share of sales not declared, in percentage 
Size Firm size dummies Size=28 employees for “small”, 275 for “medium” and 750 for “large” firms; these were inside the three WBES ranges: 5-50, 51-500; > 500 
Customers Number of customers Number of customers at the survey year. 
Firmage Age of Firm Age of Firm at the survey year 
Conf_justice Confidence in Judicial System 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "tend to agree", "mostly 
agree", or "fully agree" to the question: Confident judicial system will uphold 
property rights?, 0 otherwise  
DEffGovt 
Efficiency of 
government in 
delivering services 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "somewhat efficient", 
"efficient" or "very efficient" to the question: How would you generally rate 
the efficiency of central and local government in delivering services, 0 
otherwise  
BClegalsyst 
Business constraint: 
legal system/conflict 
resolution 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", "major" 
or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is functioning of the 
judiciary for the operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCanticomp 
Business constraint:  
anti-
competitive/informal 
practices 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", "major" 
or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is anti-competitive/informal 
practices for the operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCcrime Business constraint: crime, theft, disorder 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", "major" 
or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is crime, theft, disorder for 
the operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCcorrupt Business constraint: corruption 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", "major" 
or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is corruption for the 
operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCinstable 
Business constraint: 
macroeconomic 
instability  (infl., exch. 
rate) 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", "major" 
or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is macroeconomic instability 
for the operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCpolicy 
Business constraint: 
economic & 
regulatory policy 
uncertainty 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", "major" 
or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is economic & regulatory 
policy uncertainty for the operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
 
BClic 
Business constraint: 
licensing  and 
operating permits 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", "major" 
or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is licensing  and operating 
permits for the operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BClabregu Business constraint: labour regulations 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", "major" 
or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is labour regulations for the 
operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
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Table A1: Continued 
Income Income grouping for survey year 
Firm Income = 1 if "low"; =2 if "lower-middle"; = 3 if "upper-middle" = 4 if 
"high"; = 5 if "high oecd" 
Dexport Exporter Dummy variable (=1) if the firm is an exporter, 0 otherwise  
Dforeign  Foreign Dummy variable (=1) if the firm is of foreign ownership, 0 otherwise  
time Year of Survey Takes the value 0 in base year 2002 and maximum value is 4 in 2006  
Country 
Variables 
Country 
characteristics  Definition (Source) 
lpop Population  Population of the country in millions in the survey year, expressed in Log (B)  
unemployment Unemployment rate  Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) (B) 
rol Rule of law Synthetic index, rescaled adding 4 points to the index to avoid negative values where a higher indicator denotes a higher quality rule of law (F) 
hdi Human Development Index 
Human Development Indicator from UNDP, where higher values denote higher 
development (C) 
press Freedom of Press 
Index of restrictions on media content 1) laws and regulations (0-15 points, 2) 
political pressures and controls (0-15 points), 3 repressive actions (e.g. killing 
journalists, censorship) (0-5 points). More point means less freedom. Rated: 1 
(free)  to 3 (unfree) (Freedom House: Press Freedom Survey) (H) 
emission CO2 Emission Per capita CO2 Emission (B) 
lgnp Gross National Income Log of Gross National Income per capita, PPP, (current international $) (B) 
literacy Literacy rate Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) of the country (B) 
npl Non-Performing Loans Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%) (B) 
gini Inequality, GINI coefficient GINI coefficient (B) 
cpi Corruption Perception Index Takes value of 0 (highly clean) to 10 (highly corrupt) (D) 
icrg International Country Risk Guide Takes value of 0 (least risky) to 6 (highly risky) (E) 
Source:     
A WBES http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
B WDI www.worldbank.org/data 
C HDR, UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
D  CPI http://www.transparency.org/ 
E ICRG International Country Risk Guide, Report by The PRS Group, Inc. (1984-2008) 
F World Governance Indicators 96-07 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
G Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landlocked 
H World Database of 
Happiness 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm 
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Table A2: Appendix- Countries, Years and Number of firms.  
Country Year Number of firms 
Bulgaria 2002 212 
China 2002 811 
Czech Republic 2002 232 
Estonia 2002 136 
Croatia 2002 140 
Hungary 2002 214 
Kazakhstan 2002 215 
Lithuania 2002 176 
Latvia 2002 158 
Moldova 2002 167 
Peru 2002 444 
Poland 2002 461 
Romania 2002 232 
Slovenia 2002 151 
Russia 2002 427 
Turkey 2002 490 
Ukraine 2002 427 
Brazil 2003 1514 
Guatemala 2003 451 
Honduras 2003 361 
Indonesia 2003 713 
Moldova 2003 97 
Nicaragua 2003 371 
Philippines 2003 598 
Poland 2003 101 
El Salvador 2003 424 
Uganda 2003 189 
South Africa 2003 568 
Bulgaria 2004 356 
Chile 2004 895 
Egypt 2004 961 
Morocco 2004 834 
Sri Lanka 2004 355 
Turkey 2004 525 
Azarbaijan 2005 349 
Bulgaria 2005 290 
Costa Rica 2005 287 
Czech Republic 2005 333 
Germany 2005 1192 
Dominican Republic 2005 182 
Estonia 2005 170 
Spain 2005 600 
Georgia 2005 164 
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Table A2: Continued 
Greece 2005 502 
Croatia 2005 210 
Hungary 2005 592 
Ireland 2005 490 
Jamaica 2005 73 
Kazakhstan 2005 568 
Lithuania 2005 172 
Latvia 2005 194 
Mauritius 2005 171 
Moldova 2005 321 
Macedonia 2005 182 
Poland 2005 969 
Portugal 2005 502 
Romania 2005 577 
Slovenia 2005 205 
Slovakia 2005 191 
Turkey 2005 1120 
Ukraine 2005 573 
Argentina 2006 947 
El Salvador 2006 554 
   
Total  27086 
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